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Introduction
We are stardust, we are golden
We are billion year old carbon
And we got to get ourselves back to the garden
 So sing Crosby, Stills, Nash, and Young to Joni Mitchell’s words 
from the song “Woodstock” (Mitchell).  Assigning to the concept of 
“garden” a deeper concept of a symbiotic relationship with nature, these 
words echo a message present in Henry David Thoreau’s Walden which 
Tremains relevant today.  Although the environment is in a state of 
decline stemming, in part, from the Christian-based view that separates 
man from nature, and current policies and practices do little to alleviate 
environmental damage, Thoreau suggests an alternative, environmental-
ly-friendly view where simplicity replaces excess luxury and humans are 
subject to natural systems.  The urban environmental paradox is a signifi-
cant obstacle to the implementation of Thoreau’s idea.  Using the urban 
environmental problems that result from vehicular commuting traffic as 
an example of the urban environmental paradox1, I argue that this para-
dox exists because the current hyper-individualistic viewpoint, which 
trends toward ethical egoism, is a significant obstacle to the implementa-
tion of readily-available solutions, and note that the holistic value in Aldo 
Leopold’s land ethic suggests beneficial guidelines to adopt.  Recognizing 
the arguments that have been raised against holism, I also consider how 
a holistic environmental ethical frame might withstand the criticisms and 
remain viable and useful.
Part One:  Back to the Garden
There remains little question today that the environment is in danger.  
“Every living ecosystem is in a state of decline and the rate of decline is 
increasing” says a widely varied group of monitors, such as the United 
Nations Committee on the Environment, the Smithsonian, and even the 
World Bank (Sheppard).  Though the media prefers to report a prepon-
derance of conflict on this issue, the actual research performed by Naomi 
Oreskes in 2003 shows that among peer-reviewed journal submissions, 
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the consensus position states that “rapid climate change by human-
caused inputs has been causing and will likely continue to cause warm-
ing” (Oreskes 16986).  It seems reasonable to suggest that environmental 
degradation and global warming are threatening the long term status 
of life on earth.  The correlation between anthropogenic carbon dioxide 
(CO
2
) emissions and global warming is quite clear.  Although “critics of 
global warming are right to insist that no definitive causal connection 
has been established[,][,]… there is compelling evidence linking global 
warming with human activity” (Kaufman 317).  Science explains how 
CO2 emissions cause global warming even if the causal connection has 
not been made.  Kaufman goes on to point out “it is one thing to know 
that A causes B, and another to know how A causes B.  Given what is at 
stake with global warming, prudence would counsel not holding out until 
the last shred of evidence makes a causal connection between industrial 
activity and dangerous levels of global warming undeniable” (Kaufman 
317).
 Global warming is just one element of many that shows how 
the predominant method of interacting with nature is not sustainable.  
Steeped in the Christian tradition, many humans look upon nature as 
something which is there to be used and controlled however they de-
sire.  Walter O’Briant notes that there are two separate views of man2 in 
relation to nature:  “man apart from nature” and “man a part of nature” 
(O’Briant [Kaufman] 49).  The common western paradigm maintains 
that humans are not a part of nature because they were created by an 
omniscient and omnipotent God in the image of God.  God is above all 
creation; since humans are created in His image, they too transcend 
nature.  “It is noteworthy here that this characterization has been made 
in the notions of creature, Creator, and creation,” writes O’Briant, “for 
in our religious tradition particularly the basis for man’s uniqueness has 
been found in relation to his Creator.  The most important feature of this 
relation is that man was made in the image of God” (O’Briant [Kaufman] 
50).  Humans think because they rule the world, they can do with nature 
just as they please.  This so-called western Christian view is what Lynn 
White, Jr. calls “the most anthropocentric religion the world has seen 
… [its] striking story of creation [suggests that] God planned all of this 
explicitly for man’s benefit and rule:  No item in the physical creation had 
any purpose save to serve man’s purposes” (White [Kaufman] 44).  If all 
of creation exists only to serve human’s purposes and humans are not a 
part of nature, nature becomes merely a resource to be exploited.  Man-
kind’s “careless attitude toward his environment has been reinforced by 
… a frontier attitude – the notion that whenever our surroundings are 
depleted of the elements needed for our mode of life there will always be 
virgin territory for our expropriation and exploitation” (O’Briant [Kauf-
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man] 52).  Unfortunately, unsustainable practices are leaving the world 
with no frontiers left to exploit.
 This process has not proceeded willy-nilly without any sorts of 
checks at all.  Following the predominantly utilitarian or consequential-
ist ethic of John Stuart Mill (Kaufman 9), there have been regulations 
applied in an attempt to protect the greatest number of people.  Envi-
ronmental Law and a policy system for determining it have been created.  
Unfortunately, this system does not work perfectly.
Grounded in a complex regulatory structure designed to deal with envi-
ronmental problems one at a time and pollutant by pollutant, the laws 
and regulations that comprise federal environmental law and serve as a 
template for all state environmental programs are, environmental law 
professor E. Donald Elliot explains, ‘premised on the fiction of an om-
niscient center’ capable of dealing with all environmental problems in a 
centralized and uniform manner (Shutkin 101).
While some imagination may be required to agree completely with Shut-
kin’s analysis, it is at least interesting to note that the omniscient center 
at the head of the complicated bureaucracy resembles closely the omni-
scient God at the head of Christianity; in our relationship to nature, both 
appear to be problematic.
 In addition to environmental law and policy, America also has an 
environmental movement at both the professional organizational level 
and at the grass roots level (Shutkin).  Neither, however, has successfully 
overcome the problem of separation between humans and nature; nature 
remains “out there,” apart from humans.  “‘If the overriding objective of 
environmental activism is protection of the entire environment,’ Mark 
Dowrie writes, ‘the traditional environmental movement was not more 
than half a movement.  Limited from the start, it was almost obsessively 
oriented toward wilderness, public land, and natural resources conserva-
tion” (Shutkin 120).  In this movement, humans are still not an integral 
part of nature, and nature is not an integral part of humans.  “William 
Cronon decries environmentalists’ habit of ‘idealizing a distant wilder-
ness’ at the expense of the local, the everyday” (Shutkin 120).  The “local” 
and “everyday” are the root and foundation of today’s urban environ-
ment.  Currently, more than half of the world’s population is now living 
in urban environments (Sheppard).
 Thoreau stated that “the same questions that disturb and puzzle 
and confound us have in their turn occurred to all the wise men; not one 
has been omitted; and each has answered them, according to his ability, 
by his words and his life” (Thoreau 185).  A wise man himself, Thoreau 
addressed in Walden the root causes of many of the environmental ques-
tions facing our society today.  “As early as the mid-nineteenth century, 
George Perkins Marsh and Henry David Thoreau, among others, called 
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for the conservation of nature, despairing, as Marsh did, that ‘Man has 
too long forgotten that the earth was given to him for usufruct alone, not 
for consumption, still less for profligate waste’” (Shutkin 91).  Thoreau 
was not a subscriber to the “man apart from nature” view; he is the epito-
me of the “man a part of nature” attitude.  As such, Thoreau provides the 
foundation for a very different relationship with nature.  Albert Einstein 
stated: “The problems that exist in the world today cannot be solved by 
the level of thinking that created them.”  Similarly, it seems foolish to 
think that today’s problems can be solved without stepping out of the 
box.  Clearly, the current views of nature are not working.  “More science 
and more technology are not going to get us out of the present ecologic 
crisis until we find a new religion, or rethink the old one,” states White 
(White [Kaufman] 47).  Using the same methodology over and over and 
expecting a different result is truly insane.  Thoreau’s experiment in 
Walden provides the map for an out-of-the box method, for Thoreau was 
definitely not an in-the-box philosopher.  His view of nature is nothing 
like the current popular view of today.
 “I went to the woods because I wished to live deliberately, to 
front only the essential facts of life, and see if I could not learn what it 
had to teach,” writes Thoreau (172).  While at Walden Pond, Thoreau 
lived very simply, choosing to eschew many of the assumed “necessities” 
of contemporary life.  He found they were not at all necessary.  “Most of 
the luxuries, and many of the so-called comforts of life, are not only not 
indispensable, but positive hinderances [sic] to the elevation of mankind” 
(Thoreau 115).  Cornell University economist Robert Frank would heart-
ily agree with Thoreau today.  “[Frank] argues in Luxury Fever that our 
obsession with high-end consumer items is not making us happy” (Kauf-
man 432).  This very obsession with consumer luxury items is one of the 
primary factors harming our environment today.  Items such as running 
shoes, blue jeans, and carpets take a significant toll on the environment 
through exploitation of natural resources, and human labor, and they 
produce significant quantities of air, water, and environmental pollu-
tion, in addition to other industrial waste (“Life-cycle Studies”).  Thoreau 
proved that it was more advantageous to avoid unnecessary luxuries.  “I 
wish to show at what a sacrifice this advantage is at present obtained, 
and to suggest that we may possibly so live as to secure all the advantage 
without suffering any of the disadvantage” (Thoreau 128).
 Living simply without obligation to unnecessary luxuries was 
indeed an advantage that allowed Thoreau the opportunity to focus his 
attention elsewhere.  “By deliberately reducing his material wants, [Tho-
reau] found that he could live on very little and thereby devote the bulk 
of his time striving to comprehend what nature has to teach.  Teach is 
the right word.  Thoreau views nature as a source of wisdom” (Kaufman 
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378).  Instead of nature being an object kicked around at the every whim 
of any person, nature is to Thoreau an important source of information.  
Thoreau learned to rely on a symbiotic relationship with nature for sur-
vival, which required an alteration in typical, everyday city-style, apart-
from-nature thinking.  Similarly, faced with the idea of losing the world, 
we, too should make a shift in our thinking.  Denying that we are a part of 
nature and nature is a part of us is the source of our problem.  Thoreau’s 
message in Walden serves as an example of how one can avoid this prob-
lematic style of thought.  It is easy to give a cursory glance to Walden and 
assume that the idea is for everyone to grab a small handful of spending 
money and retreat from the city to his or her own remote Walden Pond, 
build a small shack, and live simply like Thoreau did.  That, however, is 
not Thoreau’s message, nor would it be environmentally wise.  Unlike 
John Muir-influenced Murray Bookchin suggests, the Confederal sys-
tem of eco-community would appear to lead to one giant urban-esque 
landscape.  Most humans are naturally social creatures.  It is important 
to note that Thoreau was only a short distance from Concord, that he 
regularly walked to town and maintained continued interaction with 
other people, and that it was during this time that he spent his famous 
night in jail in protest of taxes to a government whose policies he did not 
support.  He writes:  “Every day or two I strolled to the village to hear 
some of the gossip which is incessantly going on there, circulating from 
mouth to mouth, or from newspaper to newspaper, and which, taken in 
homeopathic doses, was really as refreshing in its way as the rustle of 
leaves and the peeping of frogs” (Thoreau 228).  Through simile, Thoreau 
again equates human society with nature.
Kaufman notes that “reading Thoreau often brings about an inner trans-
formation that makes it impossible to participate fully in our market-
driven, consumer-oriented society in quite the same way … we can 
continue to function within it, but henceforth at some critical distance” 
(Kaufman 379).  That critical distance is the first step in beginning to 
apply new solutions.  Thoreau’s symbiotic relationship between humans 
and nature suggests a simple, sustainable lifestyle; as such, it remains 
a relevant, significant, and foundational suggestion for the alteration of 
current values that can reduce accelerating ecological decline.
Part Two:  Root, Root, Root for the Home Team?
 The adoption of Thoreau’s relationship with nature faces a signif-
icant obstacle:  the paradox of urban environmentalism.  In his forthcom-
ing book, The Paradox of Urban Environmentalism, James Sheppard 
identifies this paradox: 
Despite awareness that the values and policies adopted in urban envi-
ronments contribute to environmental trends that threaten the ability 
of urban environments to function well as habitats for multiple species, 
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and despite the fact that the knowledge needed to reverse these trends 
exists, efforts to arrest these trends continue to enjoy only halting success 
(Sheppard, forthcoming).
The urban environmental problems that result from vehicular commut-
ing traffic are an example of the urban environmental paradox.  Auto-
mobile pollution, especially in urban environments, is a fact.  Pollution 
mitigation devices such as catalytic converters have helped to reduce 
vehicular emissions.  However, the quantity of people driving single-oc-
cupancy cars has increased rapidly enough to offset these technical solu-
tions.   Add to this that many people want the newest, coolest, and often 
the most environmentally detrimental  vehicle.  Aldo Leopold metaphori-
cally anticipated this type of behavior years ago:
How like fish we are: ready, nay eager, to seize upon whatever new thing 
some wind of circumstance shakes down upon the river of time!  And 
how we rue our haste, finding the gilded morsel to contain a hook (Leo-
pold 42).
Leopold’s colorful suggestion aside, the reliance on the individual vehicle 
for commuting has also resulted in the destruction of many urban ecosys-
tems in the expansion of roadways to accommodate the ever-increasing 
number of vehicles on the road.  Fortunately, public transportation, 
carpooling, walking, and hybrid vehicles are all well-known options that 
reduce the problems of single-occupancy vehicles.  Though the overall 
benefits of these transportation alternates are clear, implementation—
especially in Kansas City—does not happen.  This is clearly an example 
of the paradox of urban environmentalism:  the problems are known, 
the solutions are known, but these solutions have little success at being 
implemented  (Sheppard).
 The prime obstacle to implementing these known, available, and 
obvious solutions rests in the preponderance of hyper-individualism, 
which is currently highly valued in our society.  When questioned, many 
people respond that public transportation, carpooling, or walking is not 
convenient, that air pollution isn’t their problem, or—even worse—that 
they are not aware that a problem exists.  Ignorance of the problem func-
tions as an incentive to avoid action; if people refuse to acknowledge the 
problem, they do not have to act.  The other common responses—“it’s 
inconvenient, I can’t do it” and “it’s not my problem”—suggest an indi-
vidualistic trend that is heading toward psychological egoism, which Tom 
Beauchamp and Norman Bowie identify as “the view that everyone is 
always motivated to act in his or her own perceived self interest (Beau-
champ and Bowie 16).  It is not that the individuals really can’t use an ex-
isting solution; they merely choose not to.  Bryan Norton would identify 
this behavior as an example of a felt preference, or “[a] desire or need of 
a human individual that can at least temporarily be sated by some spe-
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cific experience” (Norton [Kaufman] 328).  This type of thinking follows 
right in line with what Richard Sylvan defines as human chauvinism, 
where “humans, or people, come first and everything else a bad last” (Syl-
van [Kaufman] 96).  Peter Singer calls it an example of speciesism, which 
“is a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests of members of 
one’s own species and against those members of other species” (Singer 
[Kaufman] 151).  Vehicular emissions, however, have exceeded even 
speciesism.  The negative impacts of air pollution are adversely affecting 
other humans—members of our own species—as well.  Our behavior is 
perverse, like the diabetic who simply must eat that chocolate chip cookie 
despite drastic medical results.  We pack ourselves, as veteran rock group 
The Police sing, “like lemmings into shiny metal boxes” and join the “sui-
cidal race” commuting to and fro each day.
 Another reason that existing solutions are enjoying only minor 
success is that the media and advertisers frequently bombard us with the 
message that hyper-individualistic behavior is acceptable and even nec-
essary.  This approaches ethical egoism, which suggests that “one ought 
always to act on the basis of one’s own best interest” (Beauchamp and 
Bowie 18).  Ethical egoism is a dangerous place to be.  Thomas Hobbes 
evaluated it this way:
Imagine a world with limited resources, where persons are approximately 
equal in their ability to harm one another, and yet, everyone acts exclu-
sively in his or her own interest… everyone would be at everyone else’s 
throat; such a ‘state of nature’ would be plagued by anxiety, violence, and 
constant danger” (Beauchamp and Bowie 18-19).
This description sounds very similar to how the media portrays many 
urban environments.  The stability of this environment would be tenuous 
at best.  J. Baird Callicott agrees:
A society, indeed, is particularly vulnerable to disintegration when its 
members become preoccupied totally with their own particular interest, 
and ignore those distinct and independent interests of the community as 
a whole (Sober [Kaufman] 305).
 Aldo Leopold’s holistic land ethic, however, offers a different 
method of thought and action from hyper-individualism which might 
help to resolve the urban environmental paradox.  His view considers the 
community as a whole, extending moral consideration to all ecosystems.  
It makes sense:  anything that damages one part, damages the whole.  “A 
thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty 
of the biotic community.  It is wrong when it tends otherwise,” reads 
Leopold’s maxim (262).  The holistic method has a strong foundation 
in the philosophy of David Hume, which suggests that not every moral 
sentiment derives from individualistic principles, but instead there are 
“inborn moral sentiments which have society as their natural object” 
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(Callicott [Kaufman] 274).  Hume suggests that “[we] adopt a more pub-
lick [sic] affection and allow that the interests of society are not… entirely 
indifferent to us” (ibid.).  Leopold extends the definition of society to 
include the “biotic community” and shows that it deserves moral consid-
eration because it is also an object of “publick affection which all normal 
human beings have inherited from a long line of ancestral social pri-
mates” (ibid.).  He establishes six important environmental management 
guidelines::  One should exercise carefulness when tinkering with nature.  
One should avoid trigger itch when intervening.  One should assess pos-
sible consequences of actions whenever possible.  People should act as 
member-managers, not as conquerors.  Pointing-the-finger blame should 
be surpassed by mutual accountability and responsibility.  Finally, people 
should connect the need to act differently with the need to think differ-
ently (Sheppard).
 Moving to Leopold’s holistic way of thinking may seem like a big 
step, but using this maxim as a guide to dealing with our obsession with 
single-occupant vehicles reduces the problem of the urban environmental 
paradox.  Carpooling, using public transportation, driving a hybrid vehi-
cle, or walking whenever possible are all existing solutions.  Each is very 
careful tinkering within an existent system.  None fail the trigger-itch 
test; we’ve known these options for a long time.  Possible consequences 
have been (or can be) evaluated when making a choice.  Everyone is an 
equal member and manager, and all equally share responsibility and 
accountability.  Choosing these logical options shows a form of thinking 
differently than most people are thinking currently about commuting; all 
apply consideration to the whole ecosystem, which is vitally important to 
establishing mutual responsibility and accountability:
There is as yet no social stigma in the possession of a gullied farm, a 
wrecked forest, or a polluted stream, provided the dividends suffice to 
send the youngsters to college.  Whatever ails the land, the government 
will fix it.  I think we have here the root of the problem.  What conserva-
tion education must build is an ethical underpinning for land economics 
and a universal curiosity to understand the land mechanism.  Conserva-
tion may then follow (Leopold 202).
 Adopting a more holistic, all-inclusive view already works on 
urban environmental problems, as William Shutkin shows with the ex-
ample of the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI) in Roxbury, 
a small urban community near downtown Boston.  Faced with hazardous 
trash dumps, toxic brownfields, and numerous other problems stemming 
from traditional urban renewal, white-flight, and abandonment issues 
(Shutkin 143-154),  what made Roxbury’s struggle successful was the 
holistic, all encompassing view:
Out of extraordinary adversity spanning several decades, the Dudley 
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neighborhood has been able to pull together to engage in comprehensive 
community planning, resulting in a sophisticated, innovative community-
building strategy.  With the full participation of neighborhood residents, 
businesses, community organizations, and local foundations, DSNI ar-
rived at the UAS [Urban Agricultural Strategy] slowly and deliberately, 
improving its civic capacity for planning and problem solving along 
the way, creating what Greg Watson calls ‘civic alchemy’ – the yeasty, 
creative mix that comes from an engaged citizenry and produces often 
unpredictable, though always beneficial, results (Shutkin 162). 
The key components here are “comprehensive community planning,” 
“full participation,” and “slow and deliberate” work toward a goal.  Each 
is an important point in Leopold’s environmental management guide-
lines.  The resulting “civic alchemy” is the crowning achievement that 
shows the great benefit of Leopold’s method: it works.
 The holistic view works well from an ecological standpoint; it 
is a very different form of thinking, however, compared to merely an 
individualistic view.  Harley Cahen provides the most astute argument 
against Leopold:  “ecosystems cannot be morally considerable because 
they do not have interests” (Cahen [Kaufman] 289).  They have no in-
terests because they have no specific goals.  Cahen asserts that the idea 
that members of an ecosystem “are cooperating to restore equilibrium” is 
“surely imaginable… each creature might instead be ‘doing its own thing,’ 
with the fortunate but incidental result that the ecosystem remains 
stable.  If this is correct, then we are dealing with a behavioral by-prod-
uct, not a systemic goal” (Cahen [Kaufman] 294, emphasis original).  As 
an illustration, Cahen cites an example from George Williams involving 
a Martian biologist observing earthlings’ behavior in a burning, crowded 
theatre.  Cahen writes: “if the crowd clogs the exits in spite of strenuous 
crowd control efforts,” the Martian could report that the crowd achieved 
the goal of self destruction by clogging the exits (Cahen [Kaufman] 294).  
The Martian would have concluded incorrectly.  Obviously, self destruc-
tion is not the goal of the crowd; it is an unintended by-product of a rush 
for individual self preservation (ibid.).  Likewise, the “good” or “bad” 
that we notice in ecological systems might be unintended by-products, 
not actual goals.  Cahen implies that even if all individual members of an 
ecosystem possess goals, stating that the ecosystem itself has a goal com-
mits the fallacy of composition:  assuming that because the parts have 
individual properties, the whole will, too (Kaufman 33).
 Cahen’s argument is compelling, but I’ll offer two examples 
that show we already accept the idea that moral consideration should 
be extended to collective systems.  Consider a baseball team and its 
long-term fans.  For my argument, the baseball team is analogous to an 
ecosystem and the fans are analogous to society in general.  Like “eco-
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system,” the collective noun “team” is a concept we create to describe the 
players and allow them to play this game together.  Each of the players 
may have an individual goal of winning the game, doing his or her best, 
or entertaining the spectators.  Extrapolating those goals to the collective 
term “team,” however, commits the fallacy of composition.  The various 
individual actions of the players result in whether or not the team wins, 
but true fans support the team either way.  Though over time, the players 
may all change, the team continues to exist and many fans continue to 
root for the home team.  In making the choice to support a baseball team 
over time, fans extend moral considerability to the team as a whole.  The 
choice to support (or not support) the team—to value it, defend it against 
put downs and ridicule, and hold it in high esteem—is a moral consider-
ation.
The corporation is another example.  It is a group of individuals working 
at their own individual tasks.  At the most simplistic level, the CEO de-
cides who should be hired and fired; the production workers add thingys 
to what-cha-ma-call-its and doodads to gizmos, creating a product.  
Individually, at the least, each person is working to complete his or her 
task and earn a paycheck.  The by-product is that the corporation makes 
a viable “thneed”—as Dr. Suess (The Lorax,) would call it—and thus a 
profit.  But the corporation itself is not a real thing:
Chief Justice Marshall, in Dartmouth College v. Woodward in 1819 gave 
the corporation its classical formulation:  ‘A corporation is an artificial 
being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.  
Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which 
the character of creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as inciden-
tal to its very existence.  These are such as are supposed best calculated 
to effect the object for which it was created’ (DeGeorge [Beuchamp and 
Bowie] 58).
 While it can be argued that a corporation has an overall goal, 
the important note is that the corporation is artificial.  Despite that, 
history shows that moral consideration has certainly been extended to 
corporations.  Over the past 150 years, Supreme Court case “findings” 
have established that the rights set forth in the First, Fourth, Fifth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution apply to corporations just 
as to individuals.3  Cahen states: “I find it best to regard talk of the rights 
of nonhumans as an enthusiastic way of asserting moral considerability” 
(Cahen [Kaufman] 289).  Clearly, the corporation is a non-living col-
lective system; clearly, the Court has extended to this collective a series 
of rights.  Though there is a difference between legal and moral rights, 
“moral rights… exist independently of and form a basis for criticizing or 
justifying legal rights” (Beauchamp and Bowie 46).  At the very least, in 
establishing its legal rights, moral consideration is extended to the corpo-
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ration.
 We are familiar with extending moral considerability—even legal 
rights—to baseball teams and corporations.  Though it makes sense, to 
suggest that we ought to extend moral considerability to ecosystems 
merely because we extend it to baseball teams and corporations unfortu-
nately commits David Hume’s is-ought fallacy:  just because something 
is, it therefore ought to be that way.  As such, Cahen’s critique remains 
a significant obstacle to fully accepting the holistic argument on its own, 
despite its obvious benefits and apparent appeal; an alternate way must 
exist.
 Bryan Norton’s “weak anthropocentrism” (Norton [Kaufman] 
326-337) provides just such an alternate.  We do not live in a world of 
absolutes.  Where hyper-individualism is one extreme and holism is the 
other, weak anthropocentrism might be the “mean between the ex-
tremes.”  Recall that Norton defines a felt preference as a human need or 
desire easily sated by a given experience.  It involves only thinking about 
oneself.  Weak anthropocentrism, on the other hand, includes considered 
preferences, which can “only be adopted after a person has rationally 
accepted an entire world view, and further, has succeeded in altering his 
felt preferences so that they are consonant with that world view” (Norton 
[Kaufman] 328).  In other words, one alters felt preferences after learn-
ing about and giving careful consideration to the consequences they 
might entail.  It is like smart shopping:  rather than buying the biggest 
and most expensive lawnmower on the market, the smart shopper would 
take in to consideration not only his desire for a shiny machine, but also 
the potential effect that machine might have on the ecosystem as a whole. 
The potential consequences of the large, gas-powered machine are dam-
ages to the environment in numerous ways (gasoline dependence, air 
pollution, grass clippings, etc.).  Knowing that, the smart shopper, then, 
might purchase an electric push mower that mulches the grass instead.  
The even smarter shopper might plant native buffalo grass, which re-
quires little or no extra water, grows only six inches tall, and never needs 
mowing.  In Norton’s view, nature functions as a teacher; once one learns 
how ecosystems function, one should consider that knowledge when 
making decisions.  Leopold would likely agree.  According to Leopold, 
learning about the environment shows that “if the land mechanism as 
a whole is good, then every part is good, whether we understand it or 
not” (Leopold 190).  Leopold’s land ethic maintains room for the indi-
vidual.  After all, humans are also an important part of nature (Thoreau, 
Walden).  J. Baird Callicott points out that Leopold’s “land ethic, thus, 
has a holistic as well as an individualistic cast” (Callicott [Kaufman] 273). 
Leopold self defines:
In short, a land ethic changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror 
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of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it.  It implies re-
spect for his fellow-members, and also respect for the community as such 
(Leopold 240).
 The most beneficial features of both weak anthropocentrism and 
Leopold’s holistic land ethic are that each (or even better, a combination 
of both) involves actually taking some sort of action.  American philoso-
pher John Dewey said:  “Philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to 
be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes 
a method for dealing with the problems of man” (Dewey 65).  Cahen’s 
argument leaves us stuck in deliberation about whether or not moral con-
siderability can be given to ecosystems, failing Dewey’s call for a method, 
and resulting in no action taking place; the paradox continues.  Leopold 
offers environmental management guidelines for action.  Norton offers a 
method that checks actions that result merely from felt preferences and 
encourages the performance of actions that result from considered pref-
erences instead.  These actions are key to avoiding the paradox of urban 
environmentalism because they account for step three:  actually imple-
menting the known and available solutions.
Conclusion
 The thinking processes that guide our interactions with the 
environment are flawed – they result in significant stress on natural 
systems, which leads to serious and accelerating ecological decline.  The 
Christian-based view that man is somehow apart from nature is problem-
atic.  Thoreau offers a different relationship that embraces nature as the 
omniscient teacher and model of variety and sustainability.  The message 
of Walden remains a significant and relevant suggestion to alter current 
values.  The problem of the urban environmental paradox, however, is a 
substantial obstacle to doing so.  It has its root in the hyper-individualis-
tic nature of our society.  We already know the problems and their solu-
tions; we’re just too self-centered to do anything about it.  Aldo Leopold 
offers the land ethic—a holistic approach—with managerial guidelines 
as a solution.  Even if the idea that ecosystems deserve no moral consid-
eration is appealing, the more holistic, weak-anthropocentric approach 
still eliminates the problem of hyper-individualism and psychological 
and ethical egoism.  Because they result in action, both Leopold’s and 
Norton’s methods are a viable and useful environmental ethical frame.  
With the urban environmental challenge at hand, both lead to the use 
of hybrid vehicles, public transportation, carpooling, and even walking 
when possible.  As such, they are an important rethinking that will allow 
application and implementation of existing and readily available urban 
environmental solutions.  Following this guide, we might recognize, as 
Crosby, Stills, Nash, and Young intone, that indeed we can “get ourselves 
back to the garden.”  
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(Endnotes)
1  The author is indebted to Dana Collins (California State Univer-
sity-Fullerton, Department of Sociology) and Shannon Jackson (UMKC, 
Department of Sociology) for an introduction to environmental sociol-
ogy; information from their lectures and other conversations are founda-
tional to the research of this document; and to James Sheppard (UMKC, 
Department of Philosophy) for numerous conversations and discussions 
about ethics, philosophy, the current state of the environment, and help-
ful comments during the drafting of this paper.
2  By “man” O’Briant and White actually refer to all humans, 
women and men.  I use the term human synonymously.
3  A by-no-means exhaustive list of Supreme Court cases show-
ing this includes: First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 
(1978), First Amendment; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), Fourth 
Amendment; Noble v. Union River Logging R. Co., 147 U.S. 165 (1893), 
Fifth Amendment, and  Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad 
Company, 118 U.S. 394 (1886) and Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad 
Company v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889), Fourteenth Amendment.  
Found at http://www.poclad.org/ModelLegalBrief.cfm#p3b1 , including 
relevant links to each case, retrieved online 6/24/06.
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